

SECRET

Pouch No. 571

Registry No. XV9335

Date. 3 October 1945

XX-9335

TO: SAINT, WASHINGTON
FROM: SAINT, LONDON
SUBJECT: Transmittal of Interrogation Report

The following Interrogation Report is herewith forwarded to you. Distribution to other stations is shown below.

SUBJECT OF REPORT: Interrogation Report on Meeting Between
WIRSING and SCHELLENBERG and of April 1945

DISTRIBUTION: Each station should note particularly any pages indicated below after its name.

x WASHINGTON
Athens
Austria
Balkans
Bern
Brussels
Bucharest
Cairo
Copenhagen
x Germany
Istanbul
Lisbon
Madrid
Oslo
Paris
Rome
Stockholm
Tangier
Warsaw

x FILES

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2006

SECRET

SECRET

COPIED IN WAR ROOM

DATE: 18.9.45.

X2126

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE CENTER
INTERROGATION SECTION
APC 403

25 July 1945

SUBJECT : Meeting between WIRSING and SCHLEIERBERG end of April 1945 -

TO : 12th Army Group.

1) Contacts with SCHLEIERBERG (First Version)

WIRSING persistently claimed to have seen SCHLEIERBERG for the last time when taking leave on 20 March 1945.

He reportedly stated to have taken up residence in HEIL RUTH vic BAD TOLZ (BAWERT) and to have stayed there until the day of his capture, denying by implication that he had taken trips of any kind.

His subsequent contacts with SCHLEIERBERG, he claimed, could be summed up in a report he wrote on President TRUMAN. Aside from that one report, he claimed, he had not taken any active part in political activities.

2) Contacts with SCHLEIERBERG (Corrected Version)

When confronted with direct evidence, taken from SANDBERGER's interrogation, WIRSING finally conceded to have seen SCHLEIERBERG once more, end of April 1945, in LUDWIG. He explained his reluctance that a casual reader of interrogator's report might derive the erroneous impression that he was a man of consequence in the NSDAP.

3) WIRSING's Alibi

In his interrogation WIRSING has consistently tried to play down his importance. WIRSING also believes that the handle to his name -- SS Sturmbannführer -- is liable to lead an experienced interrogator astray, inasmuch as it tends to overshadow his true merits, viz to have disapproved of the Nazi concept of a 'New Order' in Europe and to have gauged Germany's plight correctly at a very early stage of the war.

4) ITINERARY

WIRSING left BERLIN on 1 April 1945 heading South. After a short stay at Burg LAUENSTEIN, one of the hide-outs of Ant VI, he proceeded to TEGERNSEE (BAWERT), where he had been assigned a billet by SANDBERGER and, finding the place overcrowded with refugees, went on to HEILBRUNN vic BAD TOLZ where he put up in a private residence, retained by PATGEN for the key personnel of VI D.

5) CALL TO LUDWIG

End of April SCHLEIERBERG wired for WIRSING to look him up at the earliest possible moment. The message was conveyed to WIRSING at BAD TOLZ by SANDBERGER who did not have the telegram on him and who could only offer conjectures as to WIRSING's mission.

WIRSING immediately offered strenuous objections. He told SANDBERGER that he had been out of touch with current developments for the last four weeks and that he was not well qualified to tender any responsible advice.

SECRET

-2-

6) PROBABLE MISSION

SANDERGER told WIRSING that he assumed his call to LUECK had nothing to do with a general report on the political situation and more likely was connected with the negotiations HITLER had initiated. SCHELLENDERG probably wanted WIRSING to participate in some form in these negotiations.

7) WIRSING GIVES IN

WIRSING again raised objections, telling SANDERGER that he did not feel competent in the matter. SANDERGER, in turn, urged him to sink all objections inasmuch as SCHELLENDERG probably knew what he was doing. In deference to SANDERGER's entreaties, WIRSING finally consented to taking the trip.

8) SANDERGER'S AIDE-MEMOIRE ON ANT VI REFORMS

In the course of their conversation SANDERGER produced a typewritten aide-memoire, covering one page and sub-divided into paragraphs, which outlined certain reforms to be undertaken on KALTENBLUNNER's orders.

WIRSING claims not to recollect the exact contents of the aide-memoire and who had signed it. The gist of it was that responsibilities were divided up between WANDOK and SKORZENY, with GOTTSCHE having been assigned to some sort of liaison job.

SANDERGER asked WIRSING to take the paper along with him to LUECK and to show it to SCHELLENDERG.

9) WIRSING ON ILLUSORY CHARACTER OF REORGANIZATION

WIRSING told SANDERGER that he considered any basic reorganization of Ant VI as out of keeping with the stark reality of Germany's impending military defeat. For this reason he did not pay any particular attention to detail. He noticed however and immediately commented upon the fact that the aide-memoire made no mention of SCHELLENDERG.

10) SANDERGER COMMENTS ON REORGANIZATION

SANDERGER concurred with WIRSING to the extent of admitting that the reforms amounted to a virtual dissolution of Ant VI.

He emphasized that the solution arrived at was fraught with dangerous implications.

11) SANDERGER ON WANDOK AND SKORZENY

WANDOK was altogether unsuited for the job, SANDERGER stated.

The choice of SKORZENY he described as grotesque. SKORZENY had neither the military background nor the experience in intelligence work necessary for the job.

12) SANDERGER ON AMBIGUITY OF ORDER

SANDERGER pointed out that the aide-memoire had left one very important question unanswered:

Was the order to apply to the whole of Germany, or was it confined to the South of Germany which by virtue of the power of attorney given by HITLER had come under KALTENBLUNNER's jurisdiction?

13) SCHELLENDERG'S EXCLUSION

SANDERGER pointed out that the reorganization as outlined in the aide-memoire could be taken as a dismissal of SCHELLENDERG by implication.

S E C R E T

- 3 -

WIRSING asked SANDERGER whether one could construe the reorganization as forming the basis for plans entertained by KALTENBRUNNER to continue resistance in the recalcitrant area and also as a disavowal of SCHEELEBERG's attempts at reaching a negotiated surrender to the Western Allied through Count DERMADOTTE as intermediary.

SANDERGER conceded that this was a possible interpretation.

14) REASONS FOR SCHEELEBERG'S DISMISSAL

SANDERGER told WIRSING that WANECK did not mention the name SCHEELEBERG until SANDERGER asked him point blank. WANECK passed the matter off in a dilatory fashion and SANDERGER did not see any sense in pressing the issue.

SANDERGER summed up that from his conversation with WANECK he carried away the strong impression of having been witness to a "Hilliputan rebellion" resulting in SCHEELEBERG's ouster.

15) WIRSING TURNS OFF

SANDERGER made a last appeal to WIRSING's sense of responsibility. He argued that WIRSING knew very well that SCHEELEBERG would have nobody by his side in any surrender negotiations should begin in earnest, unless WIRSING joined him. WIRSING left by plane from BAD NIDLING air-strip the same day (April 30).

16) MEETING WITH SCHEELEBERG

Upon his arrival at LUTZCK on the evening of 30 April WIRSING learned that SCHEELEBERG had left for DUISBURG.

WIRSING then went by plane to DUISBURG where he met SCHEELEBERG just back from COITZBACH.

The conversation between WIRSING and SCHEELEBERG took place in the latter's private car and lasted several hours.

17) FAILURE OF SCHEELEBERG

SCHEELEBERG was upset by telling WIRSING that his trip to LUTZCK had been supervised by him.

In the face of COUNT HILL's categorical refusal not to entertain any offer of surrender on behalf of the Western Allies, negotiations with Count DERMADOTTE had inevitably broken down.

18) SCHEELEBERG ON DERMADOTTE'S NEGOTIATIONS

SCHEELEBERG talked at some length about his negotiations with DERMADOTTE. No new developments had come to the fore. In this connection SCHEELEBERG characterized HEDLER as the prototype of a man who can never take the right decision at the right moment.

19) WIRSING ON DERMADOTTE NEGOTIATIONS

From listening to SCHEELEBERG's account WIRSING derived the impression that he had failed to see these contacts in their right perspective, viz against the backdrop of Germany's inevitable military defeat. Otherwise, WIRSING believed, SCHEELEBERG would have not followed up this particular tack with so much fanatical zeal (Verbissenheit).

20) SCHEELEBERG ON AMT VI REORGANIZATION

SCHEELEBERG read the aide-memoire, the gist of which was apparently known to him and passed it off with a shrug of the shoulders.

S E C R E T

- 4 -

Commenting upon his (implied) dismissal as chief of Amt VI he only said 'At five minutes to twelve they take time out for a thing like that'

He made no derogatory remarks about KALTENDRUMMER and took the matter with perfect equanimity. This, in WERSING's opinion, proves his estimate of SCHLEIBERGER as a man of stature to be correct.

21) SCHLEIBERGER ON WALDORF

WALDORF, SCHLEIBERGER stated, was not exceptionally gifted for intelligence work and had been put in charge of VI E only at the request of KALTENDRUMMER. He doubted that WALDORF was a man with much vision.

22) SCHLEIBERGER ON STURZENEGGER

About STURZENEGGER, SCHLEIBERGER spoke with a great deal of acerbity.

His appointment to take charge of the military sector was merely the culmination of an intrigue of long standing. STURZENEGGER was the type of a mercenary (Landsknecht) who would probably cause a great deal of mischief while the German people would have to foot the bill.

23) WERSING FRANKLIN SPENCER MISCHEF, SCHLEIBERGER CONCURS

When WERSING expressed his indignation at the 'nihilistic' Werewolf propaganda in German broadcasts, SCHLEIBERGER hastened to reply that he had endeavored to stop this mischievous practice. He added that he considered the incitement of children a lamentable crime.

To WERSING's great astonishment SCHLEIBERGER avowed that HEBLER too was opposed to the Werewolf propaganda. Obergruppenfuhrer PRUTZMAN had been attached to HEBLER's staff upon HITLER's specific orders.

24) SCHLEIBERGER INQUIRES FURTHER ACTION

When WERSING stated that this explanation was not in accord with the facts - only a few days ago the MUNICH station had broadcast a Werewolf proclamation - SCHLEIBERGER appeared impressed and promised to bring up the matter again. He did so however. There are strong indications that HEBLER was unable to assert himself against GOEBBELS.

25) SCHLEIBERGER'S PRE-OCCUPATION WITH BERNHARDT'S CONTACTS

WERSING gained the impression that SCHLEIBERGER, even at this late hour, concentrated all his energies upon creating domestic conditions conducive to resuming contact with the Western Allies.

HEBLER, SCHLEIBERGER complained, had failed to live up to his promises and no assistance from that corner would be forthcoming.

26) SCHLEIBERGER ON KALTENDRUMMER

When asked to comment on KALTENDRUMMER's role, SCHLEIBERGER stated:

KALTENDRUMMER is cooking his own broth in Austria.

I would not be the least bit surprised if his connections with the Austrian underground movement enter into the game. In the end KALTENDRUMMER is bound to get caught in the very trap he was baited so carefully for his opposite number.

SECRET

- 5 -

27) WIRSING'S COMMENT ON POLITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KALTENDRUMMER AND SCHELLENBERG.

KALTENDRUMMER and SCHELLENBERG never saw eye to eye in matters of political strategy.

Around Christmas time 1944 WIRSING had a talk with KALTENDRUMMER in the Japanese Embassy during a dinner party of Ambassador OSHIMU. WIRSING tried to press his main argument home (see special report on EGMONT Lageberichte), viz that a cleavage among the Allies would be a windfall, to base Germany's foreign policy on the expectation of such an occurrence a fatal error.

KALTENDRUMMER suggested to WIRSING to have another long talk on the political situation. WIRSING mentioned this to SCHELLENBERG and asked for his advice what topics to touch upon. SCHELLENBERG's answer was:

Try to make KALTENDRUMMER realize that matters of world policy are not synonymous with South-Eastern policy and that the decisive questions of Germany's foreign policy cannot be decided from a vantage point in Europe's backyard.

28) WHAT NOW?

Before winding up their conversation, SCHELLENBERG asked WIRSING: What Now?

WIRSING's answer: All you can try to do now is pick up where we left off in February/March 1945 (see special report on EGMONT Lageberichte), viz to disband the SS and the Gestapo and to create all the necessary conditions for a transition period in which DRUMMING could play his part.

29) SCHELLENBERG WANTS ALL RESIGNING

WIRSING was struck by the candor with which SCHELLENBERG discussed all the topics brought up during their conversation.

In his thoughts last VI was evidently a thing of the past that had been written off or at least been relegated to a matter of secondary importance.

30) SCHELLENBERG ON GERMAN ATROCITIES

When WIRSING made a passing reference on conditions found by Allied troops in German Concentration Camps, SCHELLENBERG replied:

I am fully aware of the significance of the Allied Propaganda.

WIRSING:

I am not talking about propaganda, I am talking about the facts.

SCHELLENBERG:

I had nothing whatever to do with the executive, but I would not be the least bit surprised if the incompetent people who always caused trouble, have perpetrated deeds which will be put to the discredit to the whole German people.

31) WIRSING RETURNS TO DAVARIA

As soon as SCHELLENBERG apprised him of the futility of further attempts to negotiate, WIRSING declared that he saw no sense in staying on in HOLSTEIN and that he would return to DAVARIA to his family and his few remaining belongings. SCHELLENBERG offered no objections.

He offered to arrange for a trip to SWEDEN if WIRSING cared to quit Germany. WIRSING declined. WIRSING returned by plane to HEILBRUNN on 3 May 1945.

32) CONTENT OF SS-STURMBÄNFÜHRER DR. HOTTEL, CHIEF REFERENT OF VI E. RSHA.

SCHENKLEBERG'S DISMISAL

WIRSING's assumption that SCHENKLEBERG had been eliminated from the command of Ant VI is absolutely correct. This decision was made by KALTENBRUNNER himself, in the presence of MERTZ, GORZENTY and Dr. HOTTEL, at a meeting in Hotel Österreichischer Hof at SALZBURG around the 25 April.

KALTENBRUNNER DISMISSED GORZENTY

In talks that took place around 25 April in Alt Aussee KALTENBRUNNER had already expressed the opinion that GORZENTY was a double-crossed by SCHENKLEBERG who had thrown in his lot with HEIDLER.

WIRSING'S

WIRSING's chief of attorney for a long time, inseparable with his own, merely agreed to KALTENBRUNNER that SCHENKLEBERG was in on the case and probably with the goal of harming the plans of KALTENBRUNNER's Austrian proclivities.

WIRSING'S POLITICAL ADVISE TO HEIDLER AND BERGER

WIRSING's chief of attorney also advised HEIDLER and BERGER on matters of law. He felt strong about in his belief after learning through the press of HEIDLER's current negotiations with Count BERNDORF.

KALTENBRUNNER's chief of attorney following introduced Count BERNDORF to HEIDLER, was sure that HEIDLER and BERGER would use this connection for their own personal interests.

NO AGREEMENT WITH SCHENKLEBERG

It decided KALTENBRUNNER in particular ways with SCHENKLEBERG was the possibility that matters had come to pass where an Austrian solution was the only one possible.

KALTENBRUNNER very likely feared that SCHENKLEBERG would pursue his own political line via certain other connections which KALTENBRUNNER had reserved for his own use (MERTZ).

WIRSING'S POLITICAL DISMISSED FOR SCHENKLEBERG

KALTENBRUNNER had been then once taken up the cudgels in SCHENKLEBERG's behalf and for that reason must be conceived to be disloyalty on the part of SCHENKLEBERG, increased his own force.

KALTENBRUNNER once remarked:

I can almost hear SCHENKLEBERG, in his unctuous manner, draw HEIDLER's attention to the dangers inherent in my Austrian separatism. At a skillfully chosen opportunity he will then bring BERGER's personality into the discussion.

THE OLD ANT VI BEHIND REPAIR

The cue was furnished by Dr. MUHMANN who had just returned from INNSBRUCK and who told KALTENBRUNNER in SALZBURG (25 April) that SANDERGER had asked Gauleiter HOFER of TYROL to arrange for billets for the personnel of Ant VI. MERTZ and GORZENTY immediately hooked in, telling KALTENBRUNNER that there was absolutely no sense in trying to re-activate Ant VI, also in view of the circum-

S E C R E T

- 7 -

tance that, according to SKORZENY, all telephone communications had broken down. SKORZENY also mentioned that the hide-out of Ant VI in Burg LAUENSTEIN had been evacuated in a hurry with American tanks dangerously close and that most of the group chiefs had paid out their personnel, loaded themselves and their secretaries into cars and taken off. Ant VI was therefore a thing of the past.

REORGANIZATION BASED ON VI E AND VI S

Inasmuch as the only groups still existent were VI E (TANZACK-HOTTEL) and VI S (SKORZENY), a re-organization appeared conceivable only on the basis of the Austrian concept esp. in the field of intelligence. To HAUPTBEREITER and his advisers it appeared the logical solution to create something similar to the old Ant VI with VI E and VI S as the foundation.

HAUPTBEREITER'S ORDER

WILSON, assisted by SKORZENY, immediately drafted an order putting into effect their proposals. HAUPTBEREITER SIGNED. Besides giving an outline of the re-organization decided upon, the order directed HAUPTBEREITER to liquidate the old Ant VI in accordance with directives issued by TANZACK and SKORZENY for their respective sectors.

/s/ EDWARD L. KING
Major, Inf.
Commanding.

K I